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ABSTRACT
This study presents historical evidence for six countries (the U.S.
U.K., Germany, France, Canada, Sweden) in the period 1870—1933 on the impact
of financial crises on economic activity and on the international
transmission of financial crises. The paper examines two approaches in the
literature to the role and importance of financial crises as disturbances to
domestic and international economic activity, that of the
monetarists——Friedman and Schwartz and Cagan, and that of Fisher—Minsky and
Kindleberger.
In a comparison of reference cycle contractions for the six
countries over the period 1870—1933 severe contractions in economic activity
were in all cases accompanied by monetary contraction, in most cases with
stock market crashes, bat not with the exception of the U.S., by banking
crises. The unique performance of the U.S. can be attributed to the absence
of a nationwide branch banking system compared to the five other countries
examined, and the less effective role played by the U.S. monetary authorities
in acting as a lender of last resort.
Our principal findings on the international transmission of finan-
cial crises are two. First, consistent with the monetarist approach, that
under the Classical gold standard, in periods containing financial crises,
nations' money supplies were linked by gold flows and changes in high powered
money, while under periods of flexible exchange rates there is evidence of
insulation of domestic monetary and real variables from foreign shocks.
Second, in sympathy with the Kindleberger—Minsky approach, the
similarity between countries of turning points in stock market prices, the
common incidence of stock market crises, and the similar importance of the
deposit reserve ratio as the key determinant of monetary contraction in all
countries (except the u.s.) suggests that arbitrage in stock prices was a
channel for the international transmission of crises.
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1 .INTRODUCTION
Recent fears of insolvency of major U.S. banks and the threatposed to
world economic stability has raised considerable interest inthe topic of
financial crises and in financial crises of the past.1 Thisstudy presents
historical evidence for six countries in the period 1870—1933on the impact
of financial crises on economic activity andon the international transmission
of financial crises.
Two approaches to financial crises predominate in the literature.2The
nonetarist approach of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Cagan (1965) and Schwartz
(1985) identifies financial crises with banking panicsviewing them as either
producing or aggravating the effects of monetary contraction. The second
approach identified with the work of Minsky and Kindleberger, following the
seminal work of Fisher (1932), views financial crises as a key element of
the upper turning point in the business cycle and as the inevitableconsequence
of the boom.
Many financial crises in the past two hundred years have occurred world
wide (see Kindleberger, 1978) although they have differed markedly indegree
of severity. Monetary and real channels have been emphasized in the twoapproaches
to international transmission.
According to the monetarist approach, financial crises (and also business
fluctuations) are transmitted internationally primarily through the monetary
standard.3 Under a fixedexchange rate, such as the classical gold standard,
a financial crisis in one count'y by reducing the money supply or velocity
in that country will attract gold flows from other countries. These countries2
will in turn suffer a contraction in their money supplies and a reduction
in economic activity. Transmission can also occur through short—tern capital
flows, changes in real income, and commodity arbitrage, but the way in which
these channels affect activity is primarily through monetary change. By contrast,
under flexible exchange rates, according to the monetarist approach, one would
expect the transmission of financial disturbances to be considerably muted.
According to the Kindleberger-Minsky approach financial crises are
transmitted primarily through nonmonetary channels such as link portfolios
of financial institutions, capital flows, commodity arbitrage, and changes
in the balance of trade. Monetary factors are treated as of secondary importance.
In some detail Section 2 examines these two approaches to the role and
importance of financial crises as disturbances to domestic and international
economic activity. The two approaches can in some sense be treated as complements
rather than substitutes. Both emphasize the role of monetary and nonmonetary
factors in precipitating and transmitting crises, with different weights placed.
by each approaches on each set of factors. In what follows we do not run
a race between the two views but rather ascertain the extent to which historical
evidence is compatible with elements of each of them.
Section 3 examines the evidence for six countries: the United States,
Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden and Canada on the relationship between
monetary contraction, the sources of monetary change, declines in economic activity
and the incidence of financial crises.In a comparison of reference cycle
contractions for the six countries over the period 1870-1933 severe contractions
in economic activity were in all cases accompanied by monetary contraction,3
in most cases with stock market crashes, but not with theexception of the
U. S., by banking crises. The unique performance of the U.S.can be attributed
to the absence of a nationwide branch banking systemcompared to the five
other countries examined, and the less effective role played by the U.S.monetary
authorities in acting as a lender of last resort.
Section 4 examines the evidence for the six countries on the international
transmission of financial crises. Our principal findings are two. First,
consistent with the rnonetarist approach, that under the Classicalgold standard,
in periods containing financial crises, nations'money supplies were linked
by gold flows and changes in high powered money, while under periods of flexible
exchange rates there is evidence of insulation of domestic monetary and real
variables from foreign shocks.
Second in sympathy with the Kindleberger—Minsky approach, the similarity
between countries of turning points in stock market prices, the common incidence
of stock market crises, and the similar importance of the depositreserve
ratio as the key determinant of monetary contraction in all countries (except
the U.S.) suggests that arbitrage in stock prices was a channel for the international
trZansmission of crises.
Finally section 5 contains a conclusion and discusses some implications
of the historical record for the present situation.
2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO FINANCIAL CRISES
Of two main approaches to understanding the role and importance of financial
crises, the approach of Friedman and Schwartz (l963a) and Cagan (1965) identifies
financial crises with banking panics. Banking panics in turn may be a source
of monetary contraction or may aggravate the effects of monetary contraction4
on economic activity.4 The second approach following the seminal work of
Fisher (1932), views financial crises as a part of the normalfunctioning
of the business cycle, and explains them as a naturalconsequence of "financial
fragility" and "overindebtedness."
The Monetarist Approach to Financial Crises
In their monumental A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960,
Friedman and Schwartz devote considerable attention to the role of banking
panics in producing monetary instability in the United States.For Friedman
and Schwartz, banking panics are important because of their effects on the
money supply and hence on economic activity. Over the approximate one—hundred-year
span studied, the United States had six severe contractions, of which four
were marked by major banking or monetary disturbances (Friedman and Schwartz,
l963a, p. 677). Indeed banking panics "have greatly intensified (severe)
contractions if indeed they have not been the primary factor converting what
would otherwise have been mild contractions into severe ones" (1963a,pp. 441-442).
According to Friedman and Schwartz, banking panics arise out of the loss
of confidence by the public in the ability of banks to convert deposits into
currency. A loss of confidence is typically precipitated by the failure of
some important financial institution (e.g. as in 1873, 1893). Attempts by
the public to increase the fraction of its money holdings held in currency
in a fractional reserve banking system can only be met by a multiple contraction
of deposits. A banking panic in turn, if not allayed by the suspension of
convertibility of deposits into currency and the issuance of clearing house
certificates (as was often the case before the establishment of the FederalS
Reserve in 1914) or by early intervention by the monetaryauthorities, will
produce massive bank failures. Such failures will be the consequence of otherwise
Sound banks being forced into insolvency by a fail in the value of theirassets
induced by a mass scramble for liquidity.
Banking panics leading to widespread bank failures, such as occurred
in the 1929—33 period, primarily by reducing themoney stock through a decline
in both the deposit—currency and deposit—reserve ratios, have deleterious
effects on economic activity.
Friedman and Schwartz make an important distinction between the arithmetic
and the economic aspects of a banking panic.In their discussion of the panic
of 1893 they state "the panic had important effects on the banking structure,...;
and it undoubtedly affected the detailed timing, form, and impact of the economic
adjustment. At the same time, it was at bottom simply the way in which an
adjustment, forced by other considerations, worked itself out. The price
declines abroad and the distrust of the maintenance of the gold standard by
the United States meant that there were only two alternatives:(1) a sizable
decline in U.S. prices and a decline or a reduced rate of rise in money income;
or (2) the abandonment of the gold standard and the depreciation of the dollar
relative to other currencies. Given the maintenance of the gold standard,
the adjustments in prices and income were unavoidable. If they had not occurred
through the banking panic and the accompanying deepening of the recession
underway, they would have taken place in some other way" (Friedman and Schwartz,
1963, pp. 110—11 ).
Indeedthe peculiarities of the U.S. banking system as it developed in
the nineteenth century with its unit fractional reserve banking system and6
reserves pyramided in New York made it highly susceptible to banking panics.
This vulnerability was finally ended by the introduction of federaldeposit
insurance in 1934 which served to remove the public's fear for its ability
to convert deposits into currency.
Friedman and Schwartz highlight the importance in thepre FDIC system
of strong and responsible leadership exercising timely judgment inintervening
to allay the public's fears. Before the advent of the Fed, such intervention
by the New York clearing banks in suspending convertibility and issuing clearing
house certificates and, on occasion, in conducting open market purchasesby
the Treasury was generally successful, although not sufficient toprevent
severe monetary contraction. The Federal Reserve System established in part
to provide such leadership failed dismally in the 1929—33 contraction.
According to Friedman and Schwartz, had the Fed conducted open market
operations in 1930 and 1931 to provide the reserves needed by the banking
system, the series of bank failures producing the massive unprecedented declineS
in the money stock would have been prevented.
Finally according to Friedman and Schwartz, economic disturbances are
spread internationally by the monetary standard. U.S. monetary disturbances
during the 1929-33 contraction quickly spread abroad to other gold countries
through the gold exchange standard. Only countries on flexible exchange rates
with the U.S., such as China, and Spain, escaped its ravages.5
Cagan (1965) in Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money,
1875—1960, carefully analyzed the role of banking panics in the cyclical behavior
of the [1.5. morLey supply. Cagan, like Friedman and Schwartz, explained the7
incidence of panics by events such as the failure of prominent financialinstitutions
or railroads. The resulting decline in the public's confidence in the banks,
by raising both the public's currency-money ratio and the banking system's
reserve-deposit ratio, led to a contraction in the money supply.6 Cagan attributed
the high incidence of banking panics in the U.S. experience "to thepre—World
War I banking system with its inverted pyramid of credit restingon New York
City banks and the absence of emergency reserves provided by a central bank.
and to "sharp outflows of gold which sometimes forced banks to contract credit
too fast" (Cagan, 1965, pp. 226—227).
Finally, Cagan presented strong evidence that panics in the U.S. experience
did not precipitate cyclical downturns since they all followed peaks in economic
activity. Moreover, though panics were important in several cycles in reducing
money growth more than would otherwise have happened and in converting mild
contractions into severe contractions, he concluded based on the evidence
of two severe cyclical downturns not associated with banking panics——l920—21
and 1937-38—-and two mild cyclical downturns that were associated with panics—-1890
and 1914-—that panics were neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for
producing a severe contraction.
Huffrnan and Lothian (1984) focus on the international transmission of
business cycles under the pre—1933 gold standard. They view monetary shocks
as the key sources of cyclical fluctuations, with the fixed—exchange—rate
gold standard the primary mechanism for transmission of shocks abroad. An
unexpected decline in the money supply in one country (say, the United States)
will reduce income and prices and raise interest rates in that country leading
to a balance of payments surplus and a gold and capital inflow from another- 8
(say Great Britain).In Great Britain, the gold outflow will reduce the money
supply, prices and real output and raise interest rates, leading to a new
equilibrium. Empirical evidence based on Granger—Sims causality tests provides
support for the paramount role of specie flows and money supplies in the pre—1933
gold standard transmission mechanism.
Since financial crises are important only to the extent that they affect
the money supply, they should not be a crucial part of the transmission mechanism.
In a comparison of coninon cycles in the United States and Great Britain, 1830-1933,
Huffman and Lothian found panics in only three of twelve common cycles. This
leads them to conclude that little importance should be attached to panics
as a direct channel of international transmission of cyclical fluctuations.
The Fisher—Minsky—Kindleberger Approach
In contrast to the monetarist approach which regards financial crises
as important via their influence on monetary aggregates, a tradition going
back to the nineteenth century regards financial crises as an essential part
of the upper turning point of the business cycle——as a necessary consequence
of the "excesses" of the previous boom. The modern proponents, Minsky and
Kindleberger, basically extend the views Irving Fisher expressed in Booms
and Depressions (1982).
According to Fisher (1932) and (1933) the business cycle is explained
by two key factors: overindebtedness and deflation.
"Disturbances in these two factors——debt and the purchasing power of
the monetary unit-—will set up serious disturbances in all, or nearly all,
other economic variables. On the other hand, if debt and deflation are absent,
other disturbances are powerless to bring on crises comparable in severity
to those of 1837, 1873, or 1929—33" (Fisher, 1933, p. 341).9
The upsiing in the cycle is precipitated by someexogenous event that
provides new, profitable opportunities for investment in key sectors of the
economy. Such 'starters" can be new inventions, gold discoveries or wars.
The exogenous shock encourages new investment in those sectors thatincrease
output and prices. Rising prices by raising profits encourages more investment
but also encourages speculation for capital gain. The wholeprocess is debt
financed, primarily by bank loans, which in turn by increasing deposits and
the money supply raises the price level. An overall sense of optimism will
raise velocity, fueling the expansion even further. Moreover the rising price
level by reducing the real value of outstanding debt more than the increase
in nominal debt encourages further borrowing. The process continues until
a general state of "overindebtedness"——defjned as 'whatever degree of indebtedness
multiplies unduly the chances of becoming insolvent"—— is reached (Fisher,
1932, p. 9). A state of overindebtedness exists when individuals, firms,
and banks have insufficient liquid assets to meet their liabilities.In such
a situation a crisis can be triggered by •errors in judgment by debtors or
creditors. Debtors unable to pay debts when due and unable to refinance their
positions may be forced by creditors to liquidate their assets
Such "distress selling" if widespread then triggers a "liquidity crisis"
that could in turn lead to a "debt crisis," a "banking crisis," and a deep
depression unless the process is averted by intervention by the monetary authorities..
Distress selling if engaged in by the whole community produces a decline in
the price level because, as loans are extinguished and not renewed, bank deposits
decline. As the price level falls the real value of outstanding debt rises
and, according to Fjsher, based on the assumption of money illusion both by10
debtors and creditors, it rises faster than nominal debt is extinguished. Thus
creditors see the nominal value of their collateral declining with theprice
level and hence continue to call their loans, while the real debt burden of
debtors rises so they continue to liquidate. A fallacy of composition takes
over, each individual joining the liquidation to avoid being worse off, while
the community as a whole by reducing the price level actually becomesworse
off. The process can proceed to involve bank runs as fears for their solvency
rise, and to raise the demand for money as a sense of pessimism spreads.
Real economic activity is affected by falling prices that reduce net
worth and profits leading to bankruptcy. Both factors contribute to a decline
in output and employment.In addition, while nominal interest rates fall
with deflation, real rates are increased, worsening the situation. Theprocess
can continue until either widespread bankruptcy has eliminated the overindebtedness,
or at any state a reflationary monetary policy is adopted. However, once
recovery begins, the whole process will repeat itself. Finally, depressions
are transmitted from country to country by the monetary standard.7
Minsky in a series of articles since 1957 has elaborated and extended
Fisher's theory.8 Basically Minsky has extended the notion of overindebtedness
and the processes which produce it by his concept of fragility.
According to Minsky, as the economy proceeds through the upwsing of the
business cycle, the financial structure becomes more fragile. A crisis occurs
when a fragile financial structure is shocked by some event that triggers
a sell-off of assets in a thin market producing a sharp decline in asset prices
(Minsky, 1977, 140). The fragility or robustness of a financial structure
is determined by three factors: a) the mix of hedge, speculative, and Ponzi11
finance; b) the liquidity of the portfolio; c) the extent to whichongoing
investment is debt financed.
Minsky's terms are defined as follows: "if a unit's cash flowcommitments
on debts are such that over each significant period the cashreceipts are
expected to exceed the cash payments by a significant margin, the unit is
said to be engaged in hedge financing." Speculativefinancing is defined
as "cash flow payments over some period——typically near term-—that exceed
the cash flows expected over this period." A Ponzi finance unit "isa speculative
unit for which the interest portion of its cashpayment conirnitrnents exceeds
its net income cash receipts. A Ponzi unit has to increase its debtin order
to meet its commitments on outstanding instruments" (1977,p. 143). The importance
of speculative and Ponzi finance is that a rise in the interestrate can convert
a positive into a negative present value, precipitating insolvency.
According to Minsky's approach, in the upswing of the cycle, the demand
for new investment in response to improved profit opportunities leads toa
demand for finance. Part of the new investment is directly financedby short-term
bank loans, part by equity, and part by long-term debt. As theeconomy expands
it geneates an excess demand for finance, raising interest rates. However,
the excess demand is partially and temporarily offset by financial innovation,
which in turn fuels the finance of further investment.9 Thus, the investment
boom is fueled both by an endogenous (elastic) money supply and elastic velocity.
As interest rates rise, four factors work to create a fragile financial
envi ronment:
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a) an increase in debt finance
b) a shift from long term to short term debt
c) a shift from hedge to speculative to Ponzi finance
d) a reduction in financial institutions' margin of safety
Once a fragile environment is in place, a further rise in interest rates
by shifting hedge to speculative to Ponzi financing can precipitate a refinancing
crisis where firms are unable to "rollover" their debt. In that situation
Fisher's "distress selling" process can be generated with all the attendant
consequences. The crisis can be aborted however by the central bank acting
as a lender of last resort to the money marketsit
Finally, Minsky's thesis can also explain the international transmission
of crises. Commercial banks lending abroad face additional risks. The risks
include reater economic and political uncertainty that increase the likelihood
of default and capital losses from unexpected changes in exchange rates.]tt
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Kindleberger (1978) follows Minsky and Fisher, embellishing the story
with pages of anecdotes from history. Basically some displacement which improves
profit opportunities leads to an investment boom, fueled by bank money and
rising velocity. This in turn produces a "speculative mania" involving a
shift from money to goods, "overtrading" and then "distress". At that point
some event triggers a massive shift from goods to money and a "panic" results
(Kindleberger, 1978, p. 5).
Kindleberger expands on the international transmission mechanism. In
addition to the traditional links of gold flows, the balance of trade, and
capital flows, he stresses the importance of psychological factors, commodity
arbitrage, and interest arbitrage which, by linking the banking systems of
different countries directly, can offset the normal operations of the classical
price—specie—flow mechanism.13
Although Minsky's model is limited to a single country, over—
trading has historically tended to spread from one country to another.
The conduits are many. Commodity pricesmay rise and so may the
prices of securities that are traded internationally.Speculation
in exports, imports, or foreign securities furnishes directlinks
between markets of countries. By these meanseuphoria and overtrading
in one country can be fed by capital inflows fromforeign purchases
of particular goods and assets. And if thesecapital flows lead
to inflows of gold or silver, monetary expansion in theoriginal
country is enhanced as the boom is fueled by additional supplies
of money on which higher pryamids of credit can besupported.In
an ideal world, of course, a gain of specie for one country would
be matched by a corresponding loss for another, and theresulting
expansion in the first case would be offset by the contraction in
the second.In the real world, however, while the boom in the first
country might gain speed from the increase in the supply ofreserves,
or "high-powered money", it might also rise in the second despite
the loss in monetary reserves, as investors respond torising prices
and profits abroad by joining in the speculative chase.In other
words, the potential contraction from the shrinkage on themonetary
side might be overwhelmed by the increase in speculative interest
and the rise in demand. For the two countries together, inany
event, the credit system is stretched tighter.
Kindleberger views a flexible exchange rate as an important conduit for
the international transmission of financial crises-—exchangeappreciation
and deflation, or exchange depreciation and inflation.. .can be connectedwith
bankruptcies, bank suspensions and changes in the money supply" (p. 119).
Finally, as do Fisher and Minsky, Kindleberger assumes a role to a lender
of last resort to abort the crisis but, with his additional emphasis on the
international nature of financial crisis, he stresses the need foran international
lender of last resort)4
A Comparison of the Two Approaches
The two main approaches to the role and importance of financial crises
differ in two ways. The first is over the importance of monetary change as
the primary conduit through which financial crises affect economic activity.
According to the monetarist approach, it is primarily by reducing money growth14
more than otherwise that the banking system when affected by a crisis, has
an impact on the economy. By contrast, the Kindleberger—Minsky approach sees
financial crises as being important largely independent of effects on the
money supply.
A second difference is the importance of monetary factors in the international
transmission of financial crises. According to the rnonetarist approach, transmission
should occur primarily via the monetary standard by precipitating gold flows
(or changes in international reserves) between countries that affect monetary
bases and hence money supplies. Under flexible exchange rates, transmission
would be muted. By contrast, in the Kindleberger—Fiinsky approach, transmission
can occur through a wide variety of channels including the monetary channel.
One key channel stressed by Kindleberger and Minsky is the direct link between
the banking systems of different countries. Moreover, flexible exchange rates
may serve to accelerate transmission.
In what follows we examine the extent to which historical evidence for
six countries in the period 1870—1933 conforms to each of these theories.
3.MONEY, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND FINANCIAL CRISES: THE INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
In this section is presented evidence in Table 1 for six countries in
the period 1870—1933 on the behavior of real and monetary variables during
cyclical contractions marked by financial crises. Because of data limitations
for the majority of countries much of the focus is on annual data. The use
of annual data, though the best available, makes it more difficult to discuss
the influence of a phenomenon such as a banking panic or a stock market crash
than would be possible with monthly or weekly data.15
Six countries are included. The UnitedStates, Great Britain, Germany
and France were the "core" countries in theperiod, with virtually all of
the "crises' either originating in themor greatly amplified by them. The
four countries were linked over much of theperiod by the gold standard and
gold exchange standards as well as by close real tradeand financial links.
Unfortunately, reliable monetary data are availableover the entire period
for only two of the countries——the United Statesand Great Britain. For Germany
coverage is limited to the pre World War I period and for France to thepost
World War I period, and even then the dataare spotty. Two "peripheral" but
important countries with reliable data were chosen in additionto the four
•core countries——canada (for the period 1900—1933) and Sweden (over the whole
period). The two were closely linked to the "core"countries—-canada to the
U.S., and Great Britain; Sweden to Great Britain andGermany.
Real Variables
Twelve "common international" reference cyclesare isolated by picking
turning points in the NBER reference cycle chronology for eachcountry that
corresponded as closely as possible to the British reference cyclepattern.
Thus for example, the second cycle for Great Britainhas a peak in 1883 and
a trough in 1886, the comparable cycle for the United States hasa peak in
1882 and a trough in 1885. Moreover the five other countries(in fact) had
more (the U.S. had 16) or fewer reference cycles (Germany had 11), than Great
Britain, but all these deviations in dating occurred withinor very close
to the British cycle. These deviations are characterizedas subcycles to
the common international cycle and the dates arepresented in parentheses under
the common international cycle dates.15 Thuse.g., in the third cycle Great16
Britain has a peak in 1890, a trough in 1894, the comparable "common" U.S.
cycle is designated as having a peak in 1890 and a trough in 1894. This dating
involved combining for the U.S. three NBER reference cycles designated here
as subcycles—-taking the peak from the second NBER reference cycle and the
trough frohi the third.
In addition, following Burns and Mitchell (1946), six cyclical contractions
are designated as severe denoted by (S)——cycles (1), (2), (3), (7), (9), and
(12). Column (1) of Table 1 presents the annual, and the monthly, displayed
in [],"commoninternational" reference cycle chronology, for the peaks and
troughs in business cycle contractions. Both annual and monthly data exist
for all countries except Sweden, for which only annual data is available. Cyclical
contractions are focused on since most financial, banking and stock market
crises have occurred at or shortly after the reference peak and have been
associated with the severity of the ensuing cyclical contraction.
Column (2) presents a measure of the severity of decline in real economic
activity during cyclical contractions in each country——the deviation of the
average annual percentage change in real output from the long-run trend growth
rate.
In general the severity of contractions differed considerably across
countries in the "common cycles" although the six NBER designated severe cyclical
contractions had the greatest declines in real activity in all the countries.
Financial Variables
Columns (3), (4) and (5) show the incidence for the core countries based
on various sources, of crises. Three definitions reflecting the literature
are used. For the two peripheral countries, only minimal comparable evidence
was available, shown in two columns for Canada, one for Sweden.17
Column (3) cites the presence of "financial crises"according to Kindleberger's
(1978) chronology of international financial crisesH6' 11Column (4) cites
the presence of stock market crisesaccording to Morgenstern's (1959) chronology.
In addition, following Morgenstern,superscripts indicate whether a crisis
was a major or minor, and international or local inscope. Finally, column (5)
cites, based on Thorp (1926), Friedman and Schwartz (1963a)and other sources,
the presence of banking crises, classified bysuperscripts as banking panics
(runs, failures, and suspension of payments) andbanking crises (runs and
or failures). Most banking crises and virtually allbanking panics were confined
to the U.S. in thi's period.
The qualitative evidence on the incidence of crises issupported by the
timing of turning points in two key financial variables——the long—term—short—term
interest rate differential, and Morgenstern's index of stockprices. Columns (6)
and (7) show the peaks and troughs on a monthly basis of thesetwo financial
variables.
In column (6) the interest differential chronology isreversed, reflecting
financial pressure at the specific cycle trough and ease at thepeak.In
general the troughs in this series are very close to the corresponding reference
cycle peaks, tending to follow them by only a few months. At the same time
peaks in the stock price index (column 6) tend to precede reference cycle
peaks, reflecting the stock markets role as a frequent leading indicator
of economic activity.
Monetary Variables
Columns (8) to (13) for the three core countries except France, and column (14)
for the U.S. and Great Britain display monetary variables. Monetary variables
for Canada appear in columns (5) to (10) and for Sweden in columns (4) to (8).18
Column (8) for the care countries, columns (5) and (4) far Canada and
Sweden, respectively, present a chronology of peaks and troughs of specific
cycles in monetary growth corresponding to the reference cycle chronology
-ofcolumn (1). Annual or monthly (depending on the frequency of the available
data) turrtfng points were derived following procedures developed by Friedman
and Schwartz (1963b).
For the U.S., turning points in money growth generally precede those
in business by a calendar year. However, as can be seen from the monthly
series in brackets, the use of annual averaged data greatly distorts the true
measure of the lead. Nevertheless since monthly data are available only for
Canada besides the U.S. ,theannual data is used as a crude measure of timing.
For the other countries, the turning points in money growth generally
precede but in numerous cases coincide with the turning points in business.18
Column (9) shows the deviations from long—run trend of theaverage rate
of money growth between peaks and troughs as a measure of the severity of
monetary contraction.In virtually every case, with the principal exception
of World War I in Great Britain, declines in money growth below trend are
associated with declines in economic activity in the corresponding reference
cycle contraction. Indeed the greater is the deviation of money growth from
trend, the greater the decline in economic activitiy. The most severe declines
in both money and real output occur in severe cycles characterized in many
instances by financial and stock market crises. However, the greatest declines
of all the countries examined here (with the exception of the 1920—21 episode)
occurred in the U.S. in contractions associated with banking crises.19
Columns (10) to (12) for the three core countries
(excluding France),
column (7) to (9) for Canada and (6) to (8)for Sweden show the contributions
to the specific cycle contractions inmonetary growth for the three determinants
of the money supply: high-poweredmoney; the deposit-currency ratio; and
the deposit—reserve ratio.
Cagan (1965), in his pioneering study for the U.S., found thecurrency-money
ratio to be the key determinant of cyclicalmovements in the noney supply
with high—powered money and the reserve ratio eachhaving about one half of
the influence of the currency ratio. Forsevere cycles, the order of magnitude
remained the same but the influence of thecurrency ratio increased)9 Both
Cagan and Friedman and Schwartz present evidence for the U.S. that insevere
cycles characterized by banking panics, declines in thedeposit—currency ratio
and hence in the deposit reserve ratio on several occasions ledto declines
in money growth sufficient to produce a severe contractionin economic activity.
Such results for the U.S. can be clearly seen in column (12) forthe banking
panics of 1893, and the great contraction of 1929—33.
For Great Britain, in contrast to the U.S., high-poweredmoney was
the key determinant of cyclical contractions inmoney, followed by the deposit—
currency ratio and the deposit—reserve ratio.2° For Great Britain, again
in contrast to the U.S., there were no banking crises in theperiod under
consideration, yet the two ratios acting along or jointly produced significant
declines in money in several severe contractions associated with major stock
market crises: 1872-78; 1890—93; 1900-01; 1902—03; 1907-08; and 1928—31.
However, none of the declines of the ratios, with the exception of 1930-31,
were comparable to those observed in the U.S. case.20
For Germany, the deposit—currency ratio was the most important determinant
of cyclical changes in money in specific cycle contractions. However, in
contrast to other countries, money only declined in one specific cycle contraction——
1906—07. With the exception of that episode where a decline in D/C produced
a decline in M, the Reichsbank caused H to vary countercyclically to offset
the procyclical behavior of the ratios.21 Similar toGreat Britain, German
experience was characterized by the absence of banking crises (with the exception
of a mild crisis associated with several bank failures in 1901). Yet the
decline in the ratios, especially the DIR, seemed to coincide with major stock
market crises.
In both Canada and Sweden H and DIR were the key determinants of changes
in M in cyclical contractions,22 with D/C playing a minor role. Also both
countries were characterized by stable banking systems and the absence of
panics. In the Canadian case, the banking system's DIR declined significantly
in three severe contractions associated with financial crises abroad: 1877—78;
1894—95; and 1927_31.23
Column (14) for the U.S. and G.B. presents the loan—earning asset ratio.
This ratio reflects, in periods of financial stringency, the banking system's
desire for liquidity. Thus in a severe contraction in an effort to increase
liquidity, banks will convert loans into (primarily) government securities
in order to reduce the ratio. As can be seen in the table, in both countries
the ratio declined during several severe cycles characterized by crises.
The evidence in Table 1 suggests a number of conclusions on the relationships
of money, financial crises, and real activity in the different countries.21
First, severe declines in economic activity in all countriesare associated
with (prior) declines in money growth. Second, mostsevere cyclical contractions
in all the countries examined are associated with stockmarket crises but
not, with the exception of the U.S., with banking crises. Third, thejunior
partners to high—powered money as determinants of change inmoney——the D/R
and D/C ratios——played an important role in reducingmoney growth in all countries
but not to the extent they displayed in U.S. experience,especially the role
played by the deposit—currency ratio in reducing themoney supply during contractions
involving banking panics.
Why was monetary contraction associated with financial crises moresevere
in the U.S. experience than in other countries? Oneexplanation is the greater
instability, compared to that of the five other countries, of the U.S. banking
system--a system composed largely of unit fractional reserve banks with reserves
pyramided in the New York money market. Though numerous institutional reforms
were devised to strengthen the system in the period 1862—1934, none, until
the advent of federal deposit insurance in 1934, removed the basicinstability
associated with potential threats to convertibility. Bank runs and panics
occurred whenever a shock threatened the solvency of a few key banks or other
financial institutions.
In contrast with the U.S. experience, the five other countries in the
sane period all developed nationwide branch banking systems consolidated into
a few very large banks. The system of bank branching, first successfully
developed in Scotland in the eighteenth century and emulated by other countries
including Canada and Sweden,24 represented a method of pooling risks which22
proved quite effective in guarding against the type of "house of cards" effects
common to the U.S. (and early nineteenth century British) banking system.
A second explanation for the relatively poor performance of the U.S.—-
stemming from the massive literature on the development of central banking
and especially of the Bank of England25——is the absence of an effective "lender
of last resort." Four of the six countries in our sample had centralbanks,
which by the beginning of period had (in various degrees) learned in the face
of a crisis to follow Bagehot's rule "to lend freely but at a penaltyrate,"
and to a certain extent to cooperate amongst themselves in times ofsevere
international crisis, such as the Baring crisis of 1890.26 One exception,
Canada, did not have a central bank until 1936, but the chartered banks had,
by 1890, with the compliance of the government, established an effective self—
policing agency, the Canadian Bankers Association, which acting in "locus
parentis" successfully helped insulate the Canadian banks from the deleterious
effects of U.S. banking panics in 1893 and 1907.27 The existence of such
a mechanism, whether provided by the government or by the private market,
once it proved effective would educate and instill a sense of confidence in
the public sufficient to prevent incipient crises.28
In sum the stark comparison of the U.S. with the other five countries
suggests, consistent with the monetarist approach, that financial crises involving
banking crises, had strong effects in aggravating (if not producing) the effects
of monetary contraction on the real economy.
4. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF FINANCIAL CRISES
In this section we present evidence on the international transmission
of financial crises. According to the monetarist approach, financial crises
(and also business cycles) are transmitted internationally primarily through23
the monetary standard. Under the gold standard which characterizedmuch of
the period for all the countries (see the last column of each tablefor a
chronology of monetary standards by cycle,) one would expectchanges in the
monetary gold stock to be the key source of change in high poweredmoney over
the cycle unless significant sterilization isoccurring. Under perfectly
flexible exchange rates no such link should prevail. Column (13)of Table 1
for the Ii. S., Great Britain, and Germany and column (10) for Canadashow
the percentage change in the monetary gold stock between thespecific cycle
peaks and troughs.
For the U.S., for every specific cycle contraction,except that of 1871-78
under flexible exchange rates, there is a close correlation betweenchanges
in the monetary gold stock and changes in high—poweredmoney; however, the
link is far from one-to—one, reflecting priodic sterilizationespecially
of gold outflows during contractions.
For Great Britain the association though positive is much weaker, in
accordance with the evidence of Bloomfield (1959) and others that the Bank
of England engaged in active sterilization.
For Germany, the association, though positive, is also weak. According
to McGouldrick (1984), this reflects the deliberate policy of the Reichsbank
to shield the domestic money market from external influence.
For Canada, for the few observations we have, the association is positive
and quite strong. During this period, Canada did not have a central bank
and with the exception of the operation of the Finance Act in in the interwar
period (see Shearer and Clark, 1984) did not engage in extensive intervention.24
Such evidence, though rough, shows, in agreement with I-luffman and Lothian
(1984) linkages between the money supplies of the different countries through
gold flows and high—powered money.29
Finally, the last column in each table distinguishes between periods
of fixed and flexible exchange rates. There are too few degrees of freedom
to make other than very casual comparisons. The two significant periods of
floating: 1862—78 for the U.S. and the early 1920's for all countries except
the U.S. provide some ground for comparison of the insulation properties of
fixed and flexible rates. Thus, for example, in the 1873—79 contraction we
observe both the interest differential and stock price index cycles for the
U.S. to be more out of phase with those of the European countries than in
the rest of the period, and the U.S. contraction to be considerably milder
than its European counterpart. However, the U.S. was affected by various
European crises. Similarly in the 1920's when both France and Germany floated
over much of the period, we can observe more cycles for France and fewer for
Germany than for other countries. Also France in 1926 experienced a major
financial crisis that was not transmitted abroad.
According to the Kindleberger—Minsky approach financial crises are transmitted
primarily through nonmonetary channels such as link portfolios of financial
institutions. Evidence for this approach can be seen in an international
comparison of the peaks and troughs of the interest differential (column (6))
and the stock price index (column (7)) for the four core countries. First,
troughs in the interest differential series are more closely related between
countries than are the peaks (as discussed in detail in Morgenstern (1959),
and closer links are found between the three European countries than between
any of them and the U.S.In addition, Morgenstern demonstrates that movements25
in the differential are largely explained by movements inshort—term interest
rates. The behavior of this series according to Morgenstern isevidence for
a tightly linked European short—tern capital market.Morgenstern's evidence,
as well as that of Lindert (1969) on the relative pullingpower of the discount
rate in different financial centers, suggests that in time offinancial pressure,
securities markets were especially closely linked.
Second, turning points in the stock price index arevery closely related
between the four countries, although the links between theEuropean countries
are closer than those between the U.S. and Europe.3° A comparison of the
peaks in this series and Morgenstern's chronology of stock market crises,
shown in column (4) shows a remarkable coincidence for majorcrises, that
are international in scope. Such crises often originated in the U.S. and
then spread quickly to Europe.
Third, a comparison of the turning points in the two financial variables
in columns (6) and (7) with the chronology of financial,banking, and stock
market crises in columns (3), (4), and (5) suggests that crises in thegold
standard era often tended to be international in scope but, theway in which
they manifested themselves in different countries differed considerably, especially
comparing the response of the banking system in the U.S. to that of the other
countries.
A final piece of evidence consistent with the Kindleberger—Minsky view
of transmission is based on the behavior of the deposit reserve ratio in a
number of countries and the incidence of stock market crises. In four countries,
Great Britain, Germany, Canada and Sweden, declines in the deposit reserve
were key determinants of cyclical contractions in the money supply and such
contractions often occurred at the same time as stock market crises. The apparent2€
association between declines in the DIR ratio and the incidence of stock market
crises suggests a possible additional channel of influence whereby financial
crises link money supplies between countries. The evidence indicates a link
between turning points in moneygrowth and stock price indexes (seen for the
U.S. monthly data in Table l.A by comparing columns (8) and (7))3l The link
in turn may reflect early signs of the effects of changes in money growth
on real economic activity. In combination with the evidence on the DIR, the
link suggests the following hypothetical scenario:
A sharp decline in the money stock in one country, e.g. the U.S., produced
initially by say a gold outflow, leads to a sharp decline in stock prices
(a 'crash'). The stock market crash in turn could produce, as described in
sections 1 and 2 above, in the absence of intervention, both a liquidity crisis
and a banking panic, resulting in declines in the deposit—currency and deposit—
reserve ratios. Concurrently, reflecting the tight linkage between stock
exchanges in different centers shown by Morgenstern, e.g. through a decline
in the prices of U.S. securities traded in foreign markets, the decline in
securities prices of the initiating country are transmitted to the stock market
of other countries. The decline in securities prices in these countries could
impact quickly on commercial banks that have extended call loans and brokers'
loans to the stock market and attempt to strengthen their liquidity by calling
these loans and thus reducing the loan earning asset ratio. At the same time
they increase their precautionary reserves, hence lowering the deposit—reserve
ratio.
In other words, arbitrage in stock market securities may link national
money supplies directly via their effects on commercial bank reserve ratios.
Such effects may occur before the monetary shock has had time to spread its
32
influence abroad via the traditional price specie flow mechanism.27
5.CONCLUSION
This paper has examined two main theoreticalapproaches to financial
crises and provided some historical evidencesympathetic to each of them based
on the relationship of financial crises to themoney supply, the financial
system, and real activity over the period 1870—1933 in six countries. The
evidence though highly suggestive yields the following conclusions.
The first is the important role of monetary institutions,particularly
the banking system, in explaining why some countries hadmore serious monetary
and real contractions in the face of crises. The absence ofa nationwide
branch banking system in the United States compared to five othercountries
examined, and the less effective role played by the U.S. monetary authorities
in acting as a lender of last resort may explain why the U.S.experienced
banking panics in a period when they were an historical curiosity in other
countries.
The second is an apparent connection in all the countries examined between
crises in the stock market and a decline in the commercial banking systems
deposit reserve ratio. Such a relationship may provide an alternative link
between the money supplies of different countries in addition to the traditional
linkages through gold flows and the balance of payments. A possible avenue
for fruitful further research might be to examine, using monthly data and
time series analysis, the timing of the relationship between different international
monetary linkages——on the one hand, between the stock market and other asset
markets and commercial bank portfolios, and on the other hand between gold
and international reserve flows and the monetary base.
In sun we can ask what lessons does the record of financial crises from
1870 to 1933 have for the present day situation? Key differences in institutional28
arrangements suggest that most of the factors conducive to financial crises,
especially banking crises, and their international propagation have declined
in importance.
-
Firstthe domestic banking systems of most major countries are more stable——
less likely to be subject to runs and panics——than they were before 1933.
This is especially the case of the United States following the adoption of
FDIC in 1934 and acknowledgement by the Federal Reserve System of its role
as lender of last resort. Second, we are no longer part of the fixed exchange
rate gold standard which tended to transmit economic disturbances from country
to country (although there is increasing evidence that flexible exchange rates
may not be as effective insulators as were believed).
This is not to say that financial crises can no longer occur but that
the likelihood of events such as the recent near failure of the Continental
Illinois bank producing a worldwide series of financial crises (as often occurred
before 1933) is less likely.29
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1lndeed this interest has in the last threeyears spawned three conference
volumes (Kindleberger and Laffargue (1983), Wachtel (19.82), and Capie and
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2A third recent approach is that of rationalexpectations that views
financial crises as a consequence of rational behaviour. According to this
approach, "manias" are viewed as examples of speculative bubbles. (Flood
and Garber, 1982, Blanchard and Watson, 1982), 'runs" are defined as a speculative
attack on an asset price fixing scheme (Garber, 1981) and 'panics' characterize
a run whose timing was not perfectly foreseen. (Garber, 1981).
3See Fisher (1935) and Huffman and Lothian (1984).
4A recent approach taken by Bernanke (1983) and Diamond andDybvig (1983)
argues that financial crises including bankruptcies have direct effects on
economic activity over and above their effects on the money supply. To the
extent that financial crises produce losses in the financial sector of the
economy, this raises the cost of financial intermediation and hence reduces
the efficiency of resource allocation.
5See Choudhri and Kochin (1980) for evidence of the insulation properties
of flexible exchange rates in the Spanish case and Jonung (1981) for the case
of Sweden.30
6According to Gorton (1982) banking panics are not a unique event but
represent a rational response by depositors wishing to smooth out their consumption
flows over time. Rational depositors wish to dissave in periods ofexpected
low consumption such as business cycle troughs but, since the likelihood of
suspensions of convertibility also would be highest at the trough, depositors
will rush to convert their deposits to currency when they expect a trough
to occur.
7See Fisher (1935) for evidence on the transmission of economic disturbances
in the great depression.





13Minsky's thesis has been criticized by Sinai (1979) for not yielding
any testable hypotheses, and by Goldsmith (1979) on the ground that the evidence
of history is against a key implication of Minsky's view——that financial development
and financial fragility are positively correlated. Melitz (1979) argues that
Minsky's thesis is inconsistent with evidence on the behavior of the term
structure of interest rates and the experience of countries with universal
lenders of last resort such as Sweden.Finally, Fleming (1979) argues that
one implication of Minsky's thesis——that the boom lulls economic agents into
taking a risky financial position conducive to a crisis——leads to the implausible
suggestion that central banks should increase the amount of risk in the economic
system.31
141n his discussion of the1873, 1920—21 and 1931 crises, Kindleberger
(1978) and (1973) argues that the crises couldhave been aborted by the effective
operation of a supernationa] monetary authority.
However, Moggridge (1982)
effectively argues that in the case of 1920-21,therewas no crisis hence
no need for the lender of last resort and in 1931 thatthough there was a
considerable amount of internationalcooperation, the fundamental disequilibrium
of the international monetary system could not havebeen alleviated by an
international lender of last resort.
15The use of the common internationalcycle is purely descriptive to
facilitate international comparisons. The discussionwhich follows for each
country alone is based on the NBER reference cycle chronology.
16Also included are a number ofextra "financial crises" based on Thorp
(1926), Veager (1972), and others.
17This demarcation of crisesbegs the question of whether all these events
really were crises. On this point, see Schwartz (1985)
18The observed lead from theturning points in money growth to the reference
cycle for the U.S. has been widely cited as an important piece of evidence
for "causality" from money to business. See Friedman andSchwartz (l963b),
Poole (1975). For a counter view, see Tobin (1970) and Friedman's(1970) reply.
Recent advances in the methodology of testing "for causality" Sims(1972)
confirm Friedman and Schwartz's evidence for a U.S. monetarycycle (the traditional
quantity theory approach) but the case is mixed for other countries. Mills
and Wood (1979) and Williams, Goodhart & Gowland (1976) provide evidence
for the U.K. of "causality" running from business tomoney in both the gold
standard and subsequent Bretton Woods era. These authors explain reverse32
causality by arguing that the U.K. under fixed exchange rates operated as
a small open economy, according to the monetary approach to the balance of
payments, with changes in its money supply via reserve flows caused by changes
in money demand which in turn effect changes in economic activity. Thisis
compared to the U.S., viewed essentially as a closed economy in this period,
in which changes in the money supply, interact with a stablemoney demand
to produce changes in activity according to the traditional quantitytheory
approach. However, Cassese and Lothian (1982) present convincing evidence
for a number of countries under fixed exchange rates consistent both with
a dynamic stock adjustment version of the monetary approach to the balance
of payments and a monetary theory of the cycle.
19For the 16 reference cycles displayed here, the relativecontributions
of the determinants to cyclical contractions were: H, 67.6; DIR, 3.9; and
0/c, 30.1. For six severe cycles, it was H, 38.7; DIR, 16.2; and DIG, 47.6.
20Over the 12 British cycles the relative contributions of thedeterminants
to cyclical contractions were:H, 79.3; D/C, 18.9; and DIR, 9.1. For severe
contractions, they were:H,109.0;OR, 19.7; and 0/C,—28.7.
21See McGouldrick (1983).
22See Hay (1968) and Jonung (1976).
231n the gold standard period, the Canadian chartered bankskept a large
proportion of their gold reserves in the New York, and to a lesser extent,
London money markets. These outside reserves provided a direct link between
financial conditions in these countries and Canada through the D/R ratio. See
Hay (1967, 1968) and Rich (1983).33
24For the Scottish bankingexperience, see Cameron (1967) and White (1983);
for Canada, see Jamieson (1959); for Sweden seeJonung (1977). For a comparison
between the U.S. and Canadian experiences, see White (1982).
25See e.g. Sayers (1957).
26See Sayers (1936) and Presnell (1967).
27This was done by quicklyarranging mergers between sound and failing
banks, by encouraging cooperation between strong and weaker banks in times
of stringency, and by establishing a reserve fund to be used tocompensate
deposit holders in the event of failure. Friedman and Schwartz (1963)argue
that the New York Clearing House performed a somewhat similar role instemming
incipient crises before 1914 through the issue of clearing house certificates
and by arranging for syndicates of strong banks to assist those in trouble.
As Schwartz (1985) argues, in most cases the system worked but in twoimportant
exceptions, 1893 and 1907, it did not. These may be explained, she argues,
by bad timing of relief in 1907 and public misinformation in 1893.
28See Schwartz (1985).
29Additional evidence is provided by significant correlations between
five successive pairs of countries, in periods characterized by severe cyclical
declines in economic activity, of the year to year rates of change of high
powered money. The correlations are: U.S.- G.B. .45; U.S.-Germany .53; U.S.-Sweden
.49; and Germany—Sweden .79.
30Morgensterns indices include many securities which today would be
called bonds. Also a significant fraction of the securities in the samples
underlying the indexes for the European exchanges were foreign securities
(both government and private). See Morgenstern (1959), pp. 507-528 for an
extensive discussion of the several direct linkages between stock exchanges
in the gold standard era.34
31See Sprinkel (1971) for additional U.S. evidence.
320r even possibly before raising short—term interest rates andcausing
short—term capital to flow. This would be consistent with Morgenstern's finding
that peaks in the short—term interest rates cycle tended to follow peaks in
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